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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J. R. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH R.
BAGNALL, and FLORENCE BAGNALL,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
Case No- 13,753

vs,
SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an
Idaho corporation, et al.,
Defendants and
Counter Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
The case involves a breach of contract, repossession, and
'other remedies to the seller as provided by contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court, sitting with an advisory jury, found the issues
in favor of the. plaintiffs and against the defendants.

It further

denied the defendants1 motion for judgment on the verdict, or, in
the alternative, for a new trial, and granted judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs, and against the defendants forfeiting the real estate agreement and quieting title in the plaintiffs, except for an
undivided 1/2 interest in 140.15 acres, which the court, by summary judgment and decree of quiet title, awarded to United Paint
and Colors.

Plaintiffs1 appeal from that order is also pending

before this honorable Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents seek affirmation of the judgment and decree
of the trial court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
•1-may contain errors.
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EDITORIAL NOTE
The respondents find it difficult to write a statement of
facts in response to the distorted version of "facts" submitted
by appellants. This difficulty exists because the appellants have
failed to designate a sufficient portion of the record to enable
the Supreme Court to intelligently evaluate the claims of both
parties.

The respondents have made an appropriate motion to dis-

miss the appellants' appeal, which motion is pending at the filing of this brief.
The motion to dismiss is made because the appellants failed
to designate the entire record pertaining to the issues on appeal
to this court, but rather designated only a partial transcript
which consisted of the following:

(1) all the cross-examination

of J. R. Bagnall, (2) the direct examination of Lester Romero,
(3) cross-examination of Florence Bagnall, (4) direct examination
of Reed R. Maxfield, (5) testimony of Lynn Nielsen, and (6) direct
examination of Bruce Watkins and Jackson Wanlass.

Appellants fail-

ed to bring up the record consisting of the missing portions in regards to the above witnesses, and also the entire testimony of
Judge Don V. Tibbs, Mildred S. Maxfield, LaVera Maxfield, Leland
Peterson and John Brown.
Because the respondents were concerned about the status of
the transcript, they moved the court to compel the appellants to
designate the entire record.

Upon argument before the Utah Su-

preme Court, appellants1 counsel stated to the court that the
record designated would sufficiently cover the disputed areas.
The court, therefore, acquiesed in the appellants1 assertion that
the record was. adequate to cover the appeal.
2 ~ J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law ~
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It was not until the appellant brief was received that respondents discovered the record designated by appellants omits all
contradictory and rebuttal evidence and testimony offered by
plaintiffs-respondents.

For these reasons, therefore, when refer-

ring to the record, respondents will be unable to designate the
exact page of the record in support, but will merely state the record area in the following manner, e.g.:
J. R. Bagnall - Direct, Cross (as the case may be) .
Florence Bagnall - Direct, Cross (as the case may b e ) .
The appellant brief also fails to disclose that appellants
are Suburbia Land Company of Idaho, Suburbia Land Company of Nevada, Suburbia Land Company of Utah, and Lester Romero.
Prior to appellants1 assertion to this Court that its record
on appeal was adequate, respondents had a portion of the balance
of the record designated.

Therefore, there is a partial trans-

cript of additional testimony on file with the court.
tial transcript covers the following testimony:

That par-

J. R. Bagnall,

re-direct; Lester Romer, cross and re-direct; Florence Bagnall,
direct and re-direct;

Bruce Watkins, cross, re-direct, re-cross,

and re-direct; Reed Maxfield, a very small portion of cross-examination.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts of the appellants is more argument
than fact.

It is astounding and shocking to the respondents

that the appellants, in this instance, contend that there is a
similarity between the statement of facts as contained in the
brief and that which is contained in the record.
that there is but a fleeting similarity.

The truth is

The appellants have

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law-3Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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failed to set forth that portion of the record which refutes and
contradicts their version of the facts.

They further have only

stated, without the benefit of the record, the facts most favorable to them, without giving credence to the right of the court
and the jury to believe the substantial, persuasive, and in this
case, overwhelming accumulation of evidence to the contrary.
Recognizing that a statement of facts should not be used to
argue the point, we apologize in advance for the necessity of
argument in response to argument, and beg the court's indulgence
in our criticisms of the appellants brief.
Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall are past 65 years of age.

Mr. Bagnall

holds a Masters Degree in education and Mrs. Bagnall is an accomplished writer.
history.

Both are gentle people, as indicated by their

Mr. Bagnall was a former superintendant of schools of

the North Sanpete County School District and has engaged in educational pursuits all his adult life.

In addition, he has engag-

ed in farming since he was a small boy and grew up on the property which was sold to the appellants and which he personally operated until 1952.

(J. R. Bagnall - Direct, Florence Bagnall -

Direct)
The property had been sold under a real estate contract in
1952 to the respondents1 relatives, one of whom was Mrs* Nyberg,
Mr. Bagnall 1 s sister by adoption.

An action was commenced by the

Bagnalls in 1962 to repossess the property.

That action was han-

dled by the Bagnalls 1 attorney, Don V. Tibbs, now Judge of the
Seventh Judicial District.

While the action was pending, Reed R.

Maxfield made his appearance on the scene at Mr. Tibbs 1 office.
To paraphrase Mr. Tibbs1 testimony, Maxfield appeared in
- 4 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Tibbs ! office saying that he had purchased all the outstanding
interest of the buyers under the 1952 contract (Tr. 3, 23, 24,
27, 30, 31) and that he was.prepared to make payment of the delinquency then owing under the contract.
living on the ranch.

(Tr. 320)

He indicated he was

Within a day or two of that occa-

sion, the Bagnalls had come home from California for a short vacation and, by coincidence, while they were there, Maxfield again
showed up in Tibbs1 office with his attorney, Mr* Robert Hughes,
with a suitcase full of greenbacks.

He made payment of the de-

linquency in this case in small demonination bills.
188)

(Tr. 21, 22,

(J. R. Bagnall - Direct; Florence Bagnall - Direct; Don V.

Tibbs - Direct, Cross)
One cannot readily appreciate Mr. Maxfield!s demeanor and
conduct without seeing him in court and without reading the description of the transaction given by Judge Tibbs.
0

(Tr. 99)

Q.
Could you tell us how you remember that
occasion?
A.
My recollection is that Mr. Maxfield
came in some bib overalls, farm overalls, and
they were big and, of course, I didn't know him
and he sat down and I told him that he was going
to have to have some money and he started to
bring out, as I recall, tens and twenty dollar
bills in sacks.
Q.

Bringing them out of where?

A.
Oh, every place that you could imagine,
out of those overalls and I didn't think that
there was that much money that came in overalls,
if I may put it that way.
As an adjunct to this description, Maxfield testified on
cross-examination that the money came from his transactions "with
the Uintah Finance Company, a company of which he was president
and that had become insolvent, and that he preferred to take his
. -Library,
5 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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interest in business transactions in cash, that he did not believe
in bank accounts, checking books, or record keeping.
Cross)

(Maxfield -

These facts are not contained in the appellants1 record.

In any event, the modification agreement was prepared by Mr.
Tibbs, who had relied upon the representations of Messrs. Maxfield
and Hughes that Maxfield had acquired the outstanding interest of
Mrs. Nyberg, the outstanding interest of all the other parties to
the 1952 contract; that all he wanted was a deed put in escrow and
that he would take care of the rest of the problems-

He further

stated he was prepared to sue the Bagnalls to enforce his rights.
He further advised Mr. Tibbs that he was president of Suburbia
Land Company, an Idaho corporation, and that he wanted the agreement and deed made in favor of that corporation.

(J. R. Bagnall -

Direct; Florence Bagnall - Direct; Don V. Tibbs - Direct and Cross
Mr. Maxfield made his statements in unequivocal, dogmatic
terms, more in the form of an ultimatum.

After conversing with

their attorney, Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall concluded that they were will
ing to go forward with the contract if the payments were made,
even though they had some concern about Mr. Maxfield because of
the bizarre nature of his appearance, demeanor, and threat; and,
of course, the unusual manner of payment.

(Bagnalls - Direct;

Don V. Tibbs - Direct and Cross)
From 1962 to the time of trial, Maxfield was never again current.

The record of payment is set forth in Exhibit 9, a copy of

which exhibit is set out herein.

(Bagnalls - Direct; Anderson -

Direct and Cross)
By July of 1969, the buyers had failed to make $15,502.23 in
payments on the contract as evidenced by Exhibit

!,

37", and had

-6- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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failed to pay the taxes and water assessments in the amount of
$

as shown on Exhibit 9.

(Note:

This exhibit has

been misplaced by the court or counsel for the appellants.

When

the exhibit is found, the dollar amount will be inserted.)
Maxfield had come to the Bagnalls with complicated and fictional stories of "title problems" he was encountering, none of
which had any basis in fact,

In any event, in the summer of 19 69

the Bagnalls concluded that they had to take the property back.
The property was in a sad physical condition.

(Tr. 37,38)

The

indebtedness was increasing and their security had been diminished*

They, therefore, employed a California law firm to commence

the action.

The history of the action is contained in the record.

To make a long story short, the ultimate litigation culminated in
this lawsuit in Sanpete County.

(Bagnalls - Direct; Tibbs - Di-

rect and Cross)
By various legal manipulations, the defendants-appellants
were able to keep the lawsuit in a pre-trial status for more than
four years.

During that period of time, the respondents were con-

tinually frustrated by the appellants' refusal to comply with dis-.
covery, by their convenient loss of documents, by threats of injury to person and property, and other dishonorable conduct on
the part of the appellants.

(Bagnalls - Direct)

The appellants have failed to tell the court that Suburbia
Land Company, an Idaho corporation, was incorporated January 17,
1961, and had its charter forfeited by the State of Idaho on November 30, 1961, and at the time of entering into this contract
it had no legal standing in the State of Idaho or in any other
state.

(Exhibit 38)

The evidence appears to be that the initial

••'• Law ~Library,
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officers and directors were a Mr- Rodriquez, a Mr* French, and a
Mrs. Rodriquez.

Mrs. Rodriquez was apparently a secretary in

the law office of Robert Hughes.

There are no other records for

the corporation, because the minute books and other documents have
been conveniently lost.

In July of 1962, Reed Maxfield signed as

president of the company, but it now appears that in 1962 the company did not have other officers, directors, capital, or status
in any state.

(Maxfield - Cross; Romero -

Cross; Pretrial Order)

The court will note that the defendants claim that the rights
of Suburbia of Idaho, Inc. were transferred to Suburbia Land Company, a Nevada corporation, which was incorporated on October 8,
19 62.

This corporation had its charter forfeited in March of

1964.

(Tr. 24)

The original directors of the Nevada corporation

were a Mr. Roy Barrett, a Mr* Robert Hughes, and a Mrs* Sylvia
Rodriquez.

There is no evidence that there was a change in the

directors of the corporation; however, Reed Maxfield, without the
benefit of evidentiary support in his deposition and at the trial,
claimed to be the president of the Nevada corporation, but he did
not know any of the details of its existence or demise*
were no records for the Nevada corporation.

There

(Tr. 183)(Maxfield

- Cross; Romero - Cross, Exhibit 39)
In respect to the qualification of the Nevada corporation in
Utah for the purpose of doing business, the Nevada corporation
filed a qualification statement in November of 19 62; however, it
attached to its Utah application different articles than those
which it had filed in the State of Nevada, and the articles filed

- 8 -

'.•
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with the Secretary of State of the State of Utah were not signed
or notarized and were not authenticated.

The certificate to do

business in the State of Utah; even though improperly issued in
the first place, was revoked on March 9, 1964, for failure to comply with the law.

(Maxfield - Cross; Romero - Cross; Exhibits

40 and 41)
On August 27, 1960, the Utah corporation changed its service
agent and filed a domestic information statement showing Lester
Romero, president; Maxine Romero, vice-president; and Leland Peterson, secretary-treasurer.

This corporation had its charter

suspended on September 15, 1970, for failure to pay taxes.

(Max-

field - Cross; Romero - Cross; Exhibits 42, 43 and 44)
The defendant, Reed Maxfield, then incorporated Suburbia
Land Company, a Utah corporation, on April 2, 1968*

.

The directors

of this corporation were Reed Maxfield, Lyndon Maxfield, his brother, and DeVerl Simmons, Mr. Maxfield!s hired man at the ranch
in Chester.

At this time, more than four years had transpired

during which period there was not any corporation by the name of
Suburbia Land Company with any authority to do business anywhere.
During the course of the trial it developed that Leland Peterson hcid never been secretary-treasurer of the Utah corporation.
He was called as a witness for the respondents and testified that
he knew nothing about Suburbia Land Company of Utah and claimed
he had never been an officer or director and had never attended
any stockholders meetings.

The entire testimony of Lester Romero

and Reed Maxfield in respect to this corporation was disputed and
contradicted and the document filed with the Secretary of State
concerning Peterson was perjurous and the testimony of Maxfield
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law -9Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and Romero in court concerning Peterson was unbelieved and perjurous.

It is this corporation that appellants claim to have made

the tender referred by the appellant on August 28, 1970*

(Max-

field - Cross; Romero - Cross; Peterson - Direct and Cross)
Mr. Romero contends that he has always been president of
Suburbia Land Company, the Utah corporation, even though the testimony of Mr. Romero and Mr. Maxfield in this regard is diametrically opposed,

(Maxfield - Cross; Romero - Cross)

None of the above-stated facts are reflected in the record
designated by the appellants, but all were material, germane and
persuasive in the court's decision and in the jury's decision.
Other facts not reported by the appellants nor designated in the
record will be further stated.

For example, on the date of the

modification agreement, July 15, 1962, the balance owing on the
contract was $54,142,15.

(Exhibit 9, Bagnalls - Direct, Tr. 89)

While on the date of trial, April 22, 19 74, the balance owing, exclusive of taxes, interest and assessments, was $63,298.64 (Exhibit 12) and there were delinquent taxes, interest, and assessments payable of $5,880.46.

(Exhibit 9, Bagnalls - Direct)

In

other words, during the time in which the appellants were in
possession, and even though the contract was only a five percent
contract, the outstanding balance increased by more than $14,000.
Not only that, but the appellants also failed to tell the court
that during the time they were in possession they failed to maintain the property with even minimal standards of husbandry.

They

allowed the fences to deteriorate and become broken; failed to
maintain the buildings and wasted and depreciated the assets and
security of respondents,

(Tr. 37, 38, Bagnalls - Direct)

-10-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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None of

these facts are recited in the partial record designated by appellants.
It would be impossible, within fifty pages, to correct all
the errors in appellants1 statement of facts; however, particularizing the portions that seem most material, starting with page
3, the following recited "fact" by the appellants requires comment:
At the time the modification agreement was signed on July 15,
1962, Reed R. Maxfield represented he was the president of Suburbia Land Company and that Suburbia Land Company had acquired all
of the outstanding interests of all other parties to the property.
(Tr. 23, 24, 27)

The appellees and their attorney at that time,

Don V. Tibbs, relied upon the representations of Mr. Maxfield and,
therefore, made a deed which was placed in escrow to all of the
property on the theory that the representations made by Maxfield
were true.

The fact is that they were true, but that Maxfield,

for devious, duplicitious and unscrupulous purposes, had deleted
one-half of the 140 acres acquired from Mrs. Nvberg and left it in
Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation, a corporation in
which he had an influential interest, if not control, and which
corporation conveyed the same property to United Paint and Colors
Company on March 26, 197 4.

United Paint and Colors Company is a

corporation owned by Mr. Maxfield 1 s parents and brother.

The res-

pondents have always paid the taxes on this property, even during
the delinquency of the appellants.

(Bagnalls - Direct, Exhibit 9)

The entire transaction between the appellants and respondents
was bizarre.
ing.

The respondents never knew with whom they were deal-

Maxfield had an elusive and transient air about him and he
-11-
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dealt with corporations that came and went like the wind.
thermore, he never kept any business records*
ments he made in cash.

Fur-

He made what pay-

He contends, for example, concerning his

alleged July, 1969, tender, that he had some $140,000 in cash
kept in a duffle bag in the closet of his house.
Mrs. Maxfield - Cross)

(Maxfield - Cross;

The testimony of Mrs. Maxfield was so tot-

ally incredible that the court and jury rightfully concluded that
the Maxfields were never able and willing to make tenders.

During

the period that Maxfield claimed to have over $3 00,000 in cash in
his closet he was attempting to borrow against the property at
the Bank of Ephraim.

(Tr. 300)

The jury found, as did the court,

that none of the tender offers were made in good faith and at no
time did any of the parties, Suburbia, Maxfield, or Romero, have
money by which they could make payment.

(Finding of Fact 3 5)

Getting back to appellants1 brief, a great amount of space
was used showing that plaintiffs-respondents were to render a title opinion as soon as possible.

The fact of the matter is that

Mr. Tibbs testified, as did Bagnalls, that they were not to render a title opinion at all, but rather that they were to get the
abstract prepared, deliver it to the buyer, and the buyer was to
have an opportunity to obtain a title opinion if he so desired.
Judge Tibbs testified concerning the custom in Sanpete County and
the court instructed the jury that he took judicial notice that
the ordinary custom in the profession was that the buyer secured
a title opinion for the property.

(Record of Court; Finding of

Fact 19; Special Verdict 9)
In respect to the abstract of title, notwithstanding the repeated claim that the respondents had not furnished the abstract,
~12-J. Reuben
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the record clearly showed, and Mr. Tibbs testified, that he called Mr. Maxfield repeatedly and asked him to pick up the abstract
for the purpose of reading it and Maxfield never attempted, prior
to the trial date, to acquire the abstract for the purpose of
checking the title-

(Tibbs, Bagnalls - Direct)

One other contention that is totally without foundation is
that the one-half interest in the 140 acres is in the central part
of the ranch-

It is in one of the lesser parts of the land, be-

ing meadowland that has been badly treated, is poorly situated,
and presently is a bog.

The contention that the appellants con-

cerning the one-half interest in the 140 acres, that the sellers ,
were to furnish a title opinion is just contrary to fact and contrary to evidence and is without record support in the appellants1
brief.
There was, in fact, no defect in the title of the respondents.

The appellants made no genuine claim that there was a de-

fect of title prior to the commencement of this action.

Admitted-

ly, Maxfield prepared some deeds which he took to the respondents,
contending that there were some outstanding interests, but upon
searching the title it was obvious and clear that he. had manufactured a title flaw where none existed.

He obtained deeds from a

Mr. Powell, but Powell had no conflicting claim.
that there was a flaw in the title is false.
- Direct; Maxfield - Cross)

The implication

(Tr. 79, Bagnalls

The Phillips Oil Company had checked

the title to the property, considered that the title to the property was clear and took a lease to the Bagnall property on the
basis that the title was clear.

(Tr. 77)

Further, the Bagnalls

had, by contract, retained the interest that they leased to Phil- *
'-13-
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lips.

(Bagnall - Direct)
In respect to the statements made by the appellants concern-

ing the abstracts, the title opinion and the interest of Nyberg
on page 5 of their brief, it would suffice to say that the evidence was totally controverted by Mr- Tibbs and the Bagnalls, and
the testimony of Maxfield was just unbelieveable, and the record
of the trial would so demonstrate were it before the court*
(Tibbs, Bagnalls - Direct)
In respect to the water stock referred to on page 6 of the
brief, by inadvertance one certificate covering six shares of
stock were, in fact, not put in the escrow agreement.
letter, Exhibit 23.

See also

The appellants had never made a demand for

the said stock and the water represented by the stock was being
used by the appellants.

The respondents at all times during the

course of the contract had substantially complied with the contract and the failure to put the stock in the escrow agreement
was not a material breach of contract that would justify nonpayment
of installments due under the purchase price•

When the respon-

dents learned of the error, they corrected it and the stock was
put into escrow.

The record, were it brought before the court,

would so demonstrate and, therefore, the contentions set forth
in appellants1 brief are without foundation and fail to show the
contrary and rebutting testimony offered by respondents.

(Bag-

nalls - Direct; Tibbs - Anderson)
Concerning an alleged title flaw because there exists a
county road and railroad track on the property which was not disclosed in the abstract, one merely states that the buyer cannot
claim a title defect against facts and circumstances which were
obvious to anyDigitized
buyer.
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perty since 1896 and the county road had been on the property
since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.

In fact,

Maxfield had to drive down the county road to get to the ranch
house in which he was living when he entered into the agreement
of July, 1962.

It must have been obvious to him that it was a

county road and that it took a portion of the ranch from the
acreage contained in the abstract, which was primarily described
by sections and quarter-sections*

To contend that this was a

title flaw is to insult the intelligence of the court.

Further-

more, the appellants have failed to bring up the record concerning the admission of this fact and the court1s comment on it,
whereas were it before the court, in record form, it would be
obvious that the trial court judge properly disposed of that matter.

(Finding of Fact 23)
Counsel stated that on page 7 of the brief that Reed R. Max-

field, then president of Suburbia Land Company of Utah, knew that
the plaintiff could not comply with the agreement.

This runs con-

trary to the testimony of Lester Romero, who contends that he was
president of Suburbia from April of 1968.

It was on the basis of

Romero's testimony that Maxfield was dismissed as a party to the
action because he could not have been an officer, director, or alter ego of Suburbia by reason of his testimony and that of Romero's. On the basis of his representations to the court, he was
released from the case, and yet he has the audacity to state on
page 7 of his brief and represent to this court that he was president of the company.

There is very little truth in the represen-

tations of the appellants reflected on page 7 of the brief, and,
therefore, these respondents can find no nice way in which to say
that they disagree with the representations.

Such assertions con-
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cernirig the alleged rejection of the tender were totally refuted by
the Bagnalls and Tibbs and are unsupported by evidentiary record.
The assertion by the appellants that tenders made by Maxfield, Romero, or Suburbia were in good faith is erroneous for a
multitude of reasons, none of which are reflected'in the record
brought before this court; however, the substance of the reasons
was that Maxfield was so elusive in respect to the corporations
(Suburbia) or the persons for whom he was allegedly making a tender and was so elusive in respect to what he was tendering that
it was apparent from the proof that was presented that neither
Maxfield nor Romero had means of making a bona fide tender during
any of the period of time which any of them were in possession*
The court found that the alleged tenders were all in bad faith
because the exact amount owing on the contract was easily determined from the records of the Bank of Ephraim(Tr. 17, 34, 37,
95, 131, 133, 5) or for that matter, from the records of Suburbia, Maxfield or Romero, had they made an effort to put their pencils to the calculations.
subterfuge.

The tenders, as made, were simply a

Furthermore, the representation to the court that a

tender was made by Suburbia Land Company, a Utah corporation, in
September of 1970, when that very month the corporation's charter,
was revoked for failure to pay franchise taxes is somewhat inconsistent with the contention that it had money to make payment.
Mr. Romero's performance on cross-examination concerning his
relationship with Suburbia of Utah would tax the credulity of a
child.

He did not know anything about the corporation, its con-

ception, its operation, where its records were, what bank accounts
it had, the fact that its charter had been revoked, etc.
- Cross)

(Romero

It was
proved conclusively by the respondents from the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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belated admissions of Maxfield (Tr. 15, 16, 67) and Romero that
none of the corporations, at any time, paid taxes to the State
or Federal governments, nor did they, in fact, file tax returns
(Tr. 67) notwithstanding the fact that appellants were operating
the ranch and selling grain, produce, and cattle and had leased
a part of it for which they had rental income.
ported to the government.

Nothing was re-

(Tr. 67; Stipulation into the record)

The trial court, contrary to the representations of the appellants, ruled categorically into the record during the trial
that none of the tenders made by the appellants were valid.
(Finding of Fact 18; Record not furnished)
In respect to the $400.00 payment that was received by the
Bank of Ephraim, that sum was received by the bank by virtue of
an order of the court that it be conditionally held in a separate account by the^bank until the disposition of this case.
Neither the bank nor respondents accepted the money.
Maxfield - Cross; Anderson; files and pleadings)

(Bagnalls;

Appellants did

not see fit to redeem that $400.00 and now contend that it constituted a payment which was accepted, and, therefore, constituted a waiver.

This statement of fact is blatantly contrary to

truth, to testimony, and to the record, had the record been
brought before this court.
When the appellants state that they have sustained much pain
and suffering in this case, (see page 9 of their brief) the substance of the pain and suffering, just like the substance of the
facts and truth in this case, lie with the respondents, not the
appellants.

It is particularly galling to the respondents to

have an emotional appeal made on "facts" that are unsupported or
refuted by other
witnesses in the record and which, as presented,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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could only constitute a fraud upon this court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS WERE NEVER IN DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE
MODIFICATION AGREEMENT.
Contrary to the assertions of the appellants, the question
of marketable title was never a point of issue since Maxfield represented to Mr. Tibbs and to the sellers that he had acquired
all of the balance of the outstanding interest of the parties.
(Tr. 3, 23,. 24, 27, 30, 31)

Relying on his own assertions, the

modification agreement of July 15, 1962 was made.

To blatantly

state that there was an outstanding title in the name of Mrs. Nyberg acquired by Utah Land & Development Company and, subsequentl y acquired by Utah Paint and Colors Company, a Utah corporation,
requires appellants' to ignore the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Bagnail and Mr. Tibbs.

(Tr. 69, 72, 74, 79, 81, 119)

It further re-

quires this court to ignore what the trial court and the jury obviously believed, to-wit, that Maxfield controlled Utah Valley
Land & Development Corporation and that Maxfield, in fact, had acquired the interest of Jane B. Nyberg and Utah Valley Land &'Development Corporation and that such interest (United Paint & Colors
Company) was conveyed out by Maxfield purposely in order to create
a flaw in the title justifying his failure to make payment under
the contract as required.
At no time did Maxfield advise Bagnalls of this alleged title
flaw until the action was commenced and even then, it was not until October 20, 1971, that United Paint and Colors Company, a
Utah corporation, acquired title to this outstanding interest.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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brother.

The jury and the court found Maxfield1s position unten-

able and properly concluded that if there were a flaw in the
title, it was at the instance of Maxfield and the appellants.
(Special Verdict 4, 13, 14, 15; Finding of Fact 23)
There is no adequate record before the court upon which the
facts related herein can be completely documented; however, it
must be sufficient to state that if the entire record had been
brought up, the respondents could clearly sustain their position
in the record.
The appellants seem to take comfort out of the preliminary
conclusions of the court contained in the pretrial order (see Pre-;
trial Order, pps. 6, 7) related to this alleged defect in the title.

The court stated in open court when reviewing the matter

and rendering its judgment that the pretrial order was made without sufficient information, and when there was contrary believable evidence before the court, the court was obligated to correct
the pretrial finding and, therefore, the pretrial order could not
stand opposed to the proof of fact.
Decree; and Record)

(see entire Findings of Fact;

It would have been error for the court to

have ruled otherwise than it did in Findings of Fact Nos. 14, 15,
16, 17, and 18.
In respect to the oil and gas lease of Phillips Petroleum
Company, the plaintiffs-respondents had a perfect right to lease
the oil, gas, and water rights to the property.
hibits 34 and 35)

(Bagnalls, Ex-

The entire lease was contingent upon this lit-

igation and Phillips was willing to assume the risk of the right
of the respondents to lease, knowing full well the pending litigation and the claimed rights of Maxfield and his friends.

(Bag-

nalls - Direct)
Furthermore,
under
the
with
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the buyer, they retained the fee right to 1/2 of the oil, gas
and minerals.

(Bagnalls - Direct; Exhibits 3, 35)

Whether the sellers were in default under the terms of the
modification agreement of 1962 is a factual question*

It is res-

pondents1 contention that there was sufficient evidence in the
total record, if it were before the appellate court, to support
such a finding*

Respondents, therefore, cite no case ciuthority

because Point I is a factual issue which the court correctly decided and the record would so demonstrate if it were brought before this court in its entirety.
POINT II
THE APPELLANTS NEVER MADE A VALID OR TIMELY TENDER TO THE
RESPONDENTS FOR THE DELINQUENCIES DUE UNDER THE CONTRACT.
This point is like the first point.

The appellants assume

there are no facts contrary to that which they assert.

The fact

is that the evidence of tender by appellants was so shallow and
frivolous as to cause the court and jury to question the good
faith of the appellants in making such an argument. . It would
seem apparent from the argument made by the appellants that his,
its or their tender depending on who it happens to be at the
time, was not made in good faith.

Even though the exact amounts

owing were within Maxfield 1 s knowledge, (Tr. 5, 16, 17, 34, 95,
131, 132) he continually wrote letters offering to pay "any and
all amounts due" to the sellers.

The language in the tenders of

Maxfield, Suburbia, Mrs. Maxfield and Romero are all identical
and were all written on the same typewriter, obviously by Reed
Maxfield.

(Maxfield - Cross; Mrs. Maxfield - Cross)

I

It was apparent that Maxfield was playing coy with the sellers for the respondents
proved conclusively that none of the
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parties, Suburbia, Maxfield or Romero, were able at any time to •
make payment of the delinquent amount owing to- the sellers*

The

record is replete with evidence of financial inabilities such as
the inability to pay income tax, the inability to pay franchise
tax, the revocation of charters, the delinquency in water assessments, the delinquency in payment of property taxes, the unsuccessful attempts to borrow money, (Tr. 300) all during the period
of time in which appellants contend they were making tenders.
During this time, Bagnalls, in order to prevent tax sale of their
property, were required to make the payment of taxes owing against
the property and water.

(Bagnalls -

Direct; Tibbs; Exhibit 9)

None of these facts are contained in the record brought up by
appellants.
Appellants further fail to tell the court that when the
plaintiffs attempted to accept the tenders the defendants offered
them cemetary lots (Tr. 106, 165) in Las Vegas, Nevada, or coupon
books for frozen foods in some food distribution program, (Tr.
165) but never money.

The Bagnalls had no confidence in Maxfield

(Tr. 38) after his repeated and persistent delinquencies.
85)

(Tr.

At no time from 1969 to 1974 did the defendants, in fact,

offer the plaintiffs money to bring up the delinquencies.
nalls - Direct; Maxfield - Cross)

(Bag-

On the contrary, Mr. and Mrs.

Bagnall testified that in July, 1969, they went to see Maxfield
at the ranch.

At this time they noted the deplorable condition

of their ranch.

(Tr. 37.38)

They plead with Mr. Maxfield to

bring the delinquencies up because they had payments of their own
to meet.

Mr. Maxfield, contrary to his assertion that he always

had funds, explained to them that he was not going to pay them,
that he didn'tDigitized
have
any money, and that he had already mortgaged
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the property and everything on it to other people,
39, 165)

(Tr. 35, 36,

He even produced a copy of the mortgage that he had

made to LaVera Maxfield, his mother, which he had put on the entire property to cloud the title.

(Exhibit 54)

though he did not have a deed to the property.

This he did even
Furthermore, he

told Bagnalls that he was skilled in this type of enterprise and
that he would make the matter so complicated and so difficult
that no lowyer could disentangle and clear the title.

(Tr. 39)

The substance of his statements to the respondents at that time
was that there was nothing that could be done to collect the
money from him, that it was his ranch, and that he was not going
to pay them any money for it.

This comment was. made at the same

time he contends he was making a tender.

(J. R. Bagnall - Direct)

It was this particular tender which Maxfield said in court
he could have made because he had $140,000 in a duffle bag in his
closet.

The fact that Maxfield did not do business in an ortho-

dox manner was sufficient to cause the jury to believe that he
was not entirely a wholesome character.

His willingness to pre-

varicate was sufficient to discredit his entire testimony before
the jury.

(Bagnalls - Direct; Maxfield - Cross)

During cross-examination he was caught in one lie after
another.

Maxfield, as a credible witness, was totally impugned*

For example, Maxfield, after parading before the jury his vast
experience as a corporate officer and director, admitted he did
not know a corporation had to do such fundamental things as
maintain its charter in good standing.

(Tr* 79)

It is impos-

sible for the respondents to recite the facts as to Maxfield's
credibility because the complete record is not before the court.
The most that Digitized
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the facts from memory.
Appellants extensively argue the pretrial order concerning
the validity of the tender.

The court, in its pretrial order,

however, did not pass judgment on whether the tender was made in
bad faith as that aspect was specifically reserved for trial.
(See Pretrial Order IV, 6)

The appellants tend to ignore the

special interrogatories served on the jury which, when read together, conclude that appellants1 tenders were unperformable and
made in bad faith.

The court itself concluded that the tenders

made were all in bad faith*

(See Finding of Fact 18)

It does

not serve the appellants well to argue to this court, as fact,
that which is contrary to the fact proven and for which there issubstantial evidence.
This court has repeatedly said that the statement of facts
and the argument must be on the basis of the facts as they may
have been believed by the court and jury.

On the basis of evi-

dence presented, it is impossible for the respondents to understand how the court could have ruled otherwise than that the
tenders were made in bad faith.

Appellants engage in the gym-

nastics of citing the pretrial order to the effect that their
tenders would be satisfactory if made in good faith and then totally ignore all evidence that they were made in bad faith.
It is not sufficient to cite the Utah statutes on.a valid
tender.

Both parties are aware of these statutes.

statutes were argued at length and with briefs.

The tender

The fact remains

that the court and jury found, on a question of fact, that the
tenders were made in bad faith by persons who were incapable of
making tenders, by persons who were not privy to the contract, by
persons who hadDigitized
no bylegal
existence and status, and by persons who
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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did not have practical capability of performing the tenders.
Since the facts are totally against the appellants on Point II,
it seems futile for respondents to argue the law.
a

The appellants belabor the court's Findings of Fact which

are amply supported by the special verdict of the jury.

It is

fundamental that the appellants can not complain'of a Finding
of Fact which is supported by material and substantial evidence.
The difficulty with the appellants' position is that they have
failed to bring to this court the entire record, but rather have
chosen to be selective in designating only certain portions of
the transcript from which they would appeal.
Referring to page 33 of the appellants' brief concerning the
testimony of Bruce Watkins, the appellants would have the court
believe that there was a commitment by the Clearfield State Bank
for $15,000.00.

On cross-examination, Mr. Watkins admitted that

the most he had before the bank was an application of many months
prior which had not been acted upon for a variety of reasons,
(Tr. 30, 52) all the fault of Mr. Maxfield.

Peculiarly the appli-

cation was by Mr. Maxfield for property in Sanpete County.
was for a loan to him personally.

It

He had never complied with all

of the terms of the application, such as furnishing a financial
statement.

Mr. Watkins further testified that it would be impro--

bable for the Clearfield State Bank to make the loan on property
in Sanpete County, that if a loan were to be considered it would
have to be complete documentation including knowledge of the status of the owner, (Tr. 51) in this case, Suburbia Land Company of
either Idaho, Nevada or Utah, depending on the case.

(Tr. 59)

He further stated that Maxfield had only indicated that he was a
stockholder inDigitized
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tails of Mr. Maxfield's ownership, nor did he know the amount of
stock outstanding, nor the status of the company, (Tr. 55) all of
which he said would have been essential before making a loan.

He

further stated that any loan application had to be approved by
the loan committee because it had never been submitted to the
bank in a complete form.

He further stated that upon cross-

examination, had he known the facts which had been elicited in
trial concerning the status of Suburbia Land Company, the status of Maxfield, and the other material items to the loan application which would have been required, the Clearfield Bank under
no circumstances would have made the loan.

(Tr. 55, 59)

To

contend to this court that there was a commitment is to mislead
• • >

.

•

#

•

-

.

.

this court.
Referring to Mr. Romero's claim of personal assets, the
thrift certificates referred to were the most dubious of evidence
and were admitted through sheer tolerance of the court.

The court

recognized the objections to the admissibility of such photostats
of certificates of trust issued by Interlake Thrift, noting that
there was no proof that Interlake Thrift was a viable company,
that the certificates had not been mortgaged, pledged or otherwise encumbered, or that Romero, in fact, could obtain money from
the said certificates.

(Tr. 364)

The court also acknowledged

that the best evidence of whether Romero could have gotten money
out of those certificates would have been to call someone from
Interlake Thrift Company to testify that those certificates were
in good standing on the date of the alleged tender.
The appellants cap their conclusion in respect to Point II
with this comment:
Such testimony by them [Bagnalls] is unsup-
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This statement causes the respondents to believe that Bagnalls 1 naked word was like gold compared to the evidentiary lead
offered by the appellants.
The Supreme Court of Utah in Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah 3,
36 P. 202 (1894), said that to have the effect of a valid tender,
the party making a tender "must have the ability to produce it,
and must act in good faith."
good law.

Although an old case, it is still

The weight of the evidence at trial in the instant

case overwhelmingly demonstrated appellants inability to produce
the delinquent amount after the Bagnalls had made repeated demands.
POINT III
RESPONDENTS NEVER REFUSED TO GIVE AN ACCOUNTING TO THE APPELLANTS, BUT EVEN IF THEY HAD, SUCH REFUSAL WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A
WAIVER OF PERFORMANCE/
It became obvious to the court and jury that in tne entire
series of tenders by Maxfield for Suburbia, Romero, or himself,
he never noted for whom he was making a tender.

That the tenders

were in bad faith is a conclusion that is inescapable .from the
manner and conduct of the appellants*
The ranch on which Maxfield was living when the lawsuit was
instituted is located less than five miles from Ephraim.
nalls were living in California.

The Bag-

At all times when the alleged

tenders were made, Maxfield merely had to go to the Bank of Ephraim to determine the balance owing on the contract or to determine the delinquency owing on taxes, water assessments, and principal and interest payments.

The bank kept a running account in

its escrow ledger of the balance owing and could have calculated
for Maxfield, Romero, or Suburbia the deficiencies at any given
time.

(Tr. 16, 17, 34, 95, 131, 132)

Rather than avail himself
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of the escrow agreement to which Suburbia was signatory, Maxfield
chose to write the very vague proffers of performance.
The assertions of appellants that the respondents had refused payment of the delinquencies and had insisted on the payment
of the entire amounts due and owing is contrary to the facts.
Both of the Bagnalls testified on direct examination that prior
to instituting suit they requested payment of the delinquencies
only (Tr. 38, 151) and had, in fact, journeyed to the ranch in
July of 1969, to make demand for those deficiencies and hoping
to be paid those deficiencies.

Instead, they.were met by the

responses of Maxfield that he was not going to pay them, that he
had mortgaged the property, that it was totally encumbered, and
that he did not have any money, (Tr. 38, 39, 16 5) but that the
best he could do or would do was give them some cemetary lots
(Tr. 38, 165) or some coupon books in a frozen food program.
The appellants have refused to recognize or to so advise this
court of these facts which were elicited repeatedly.

Such testi-

mony would be amply supported in the direct and cross-examination
of Judge Tibbs and in the direct examination of Mr. and Mrs. Bagnail.

But even if one were not to rely entirely upon the direct

examination of Mr. Bagnal.l, it seems to these respondents that
it is difficult for the appellants to escape Mrs. Bagnall's comment on cross-examination by Mr. Lord on page 150 and 153 of the
transcript they did send up, to this effect:
Q.
You didn't at any time along at that
meeting (July 6 to 6, 1969), state that you did
not want the property back?
• A.

No.

Q.
You did not at any time state that you
did want the property back.
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A.
We said at the end when we left him, well,
if you won't pay us then there is nothing left for
us to do but to sue.
Q.
Escuse me, I thought you were throughIsn't it also a fact that you demanded the entire
balance?
A.

No.

Q.
That you stated to him that he was to pay
off the contract in full?
ANo.
quencies.

At that time we were asking for delin-

The court should also be aware of the fact that Mr- Tibbs had
been trying to get Maxfield to pay these deficiencies by telephone
and letter prior to the date of the Bagnalls1 visit to Mr- Maxfield.
In fact, the Bagnalls journeyed out to see Mr. Maxfield to see if
they could collect the delinquencies upon the advise of Mr. Tibbs.
(Tr. 121)
Judge Tibbs, in his letter of July 9 (Defendants' Exhibit
16), refers to Maxfield's previous offers of partial payment.
Judge Tibbs testified that Maxfield had suggested rewriting the
contract and making payments substantially different than those
to which he was obligated and that after the visit of the Bagnalls he wrote the letter of July 9, 1969.

He further stated that

the letter of July 9 was only intended as a demand that the delinquencies be paid, which was consistent with his previous oral communications with Maxfield.

He testified that that letter did not

contemplate payment of the entire balance due under the contract
and that Maxfield knew, or should have known it, by reason of
that letter and the previous oral communications between Tibbs
and Maxfield.

This is a further illustration of the appellants'

efforts at distorting the facts.
The appellants,
in summary,
state
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a tender of money because they had no way of knowing the amount
due."

This type of commentary to this court in light of the re-

cord that has been offered is grossly misleading.

Respondents

cite no case law for Point III because the question of whether
the amount of the buyers 1 delinquency was readily known to them
is a fact question.
POINT IV
THE RESPONDENTS1. NOTICE OF DEFAULT WAS EFFECTIVE.
The court, in the pretrial order, found that the respondents1
notice of default was good.

In addition, the court found that

the notice served upon Reed R. Maxfield on July 31, 1970, was a.
notice stating that Suburbia Land Company was in default under
the real estate agreement and modification agreement.

The notice

provided for thirty days in which to clear the default, otherwise
the respondents would elect to terminate the agreements.

The

court further found (Finding of Fact 12) that the thirty-day notice provided for compliance and the notice of default and termination was reasonable under the circumstances.
questions of fact.

These were

The notice as written and.served satisfied

the requirements of the contract and of the law*
POINT V
RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACCEPT PAYMENT AFTER THEIR EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO APPELLANTS ON MAY 25, 1970, AND, THEREFORE, THE CONTRACT WAS
NEVER REINSTATED.
In accordance with the appellants usual candor, they have
failed to mention that the simple $400.00 payment was surretiously
made to the Ephraim Bank in a deliberate effort to develop a waiver.

The appellants knew litigation was pending and that the res-,

pondents had no intention of accepting any delinquent payments.
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Furthermore, the payment made was totally inadequate under any
sense of the word and was made for the purpose of creating a defense.
When the respondents were advised to the attempted payment,
the matter was presented to the court at a time when Judge Erickson was the judge.

Judge Erickson ordered the payment held by

the bank in a special account subject to the completion of the
litigation. The appellants did not designate Judge Erickson 1 s
order as part of the record.

On Exhibit 11, the records of the

Bank of Ephraim show this notation in respect to its receipt of
the $400.00:
Not accepted. Court order by Judge Erickson to place in special fund.
When arguing the matter to Judge Erickson, it became apparent to the appellants that Judge Erickson did not favor their
theory of the case, consequently, they filed an affidavit of prejudice against him, thereby getting a new judge* The circumstances
surrounding payment of this $400.00 have become obscured in the
legal folderol that has taken place in respect to the entire case.
If the $400.00 payment had been made simply as a delinquent
payment and had been accepted, there may have been some truth to
the appellants1 position, however, appellants know that the representations made under Point V are contrary to the fact and are
totally refuted by the evidence.
POINT VI
THE SINCERITY OF APPELLANTS1 OFFER TO PAY THE ENTIRE CONTRACT
BALANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN BEST DEMONSTRATED UNDER RULE 67, U.R.C.P.,
THEREFORE, THEIR OFFER TO PAY THE SAME TO THE COURT SHOULD BE DISREGARDED..
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Point VI is similar to Point V in as much as appellants attempt to lift themselves by their own bootstraps since appellants
fail to support their allegations concerning a proffer in Judge
Erickson 1 s court with any transcript of the record*

The best we

have is appellants1 blatant assertion that Judge Erickson refused
to allow the proffer of appellants to be heard on the motion to
accept the proffer of proof.

No one knows whether the appellants

had sufficient money to make a tender*

There certainly exists no

evidence of ability to make a valid tender in the record of the
court.
The truth seems inconsistent with appellants1 argument for
if the appellants had wanted to make payment in the court, they
could have done so pursuant to Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Nothing would have prevented the appellants from pay-

ing any amount of money into court.
always the same.

The appellants1 position is

They want to make their tender without showing

any abili.ty to perform.

The sincerity of the appellants would

have been best demonstrated by a tender into court of spendable
money.
POINT VII
THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO AMEND THE PRETRIAL ORDER WAS
NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellants argue that the pretrial order and findings of the
court are "mutually contradictory" and that the "plaintiff should
have been required to amend the pretrial order."
It is true that the Utal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16,
contemplate that a pretrial order may be amended under the proper cricumstances to "prevent manifest injustice."

The instant
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order to prevent "manifest injustice."

The failure of plaintiffs to

so amend was not reversible error.
Any contradiction between the pretrial order and findings of
the court is not reversible error because the only purpose of a
pretrial order is to control "the subsequent course of the action"
and, therefore, a pretrial order is not dispositive of the case.
The pretrial order is not so important so as to displace the decision-malting province of a court.

Any contradictions between a

pretrial order and the court's ultimate decision do not constitute reversible error.
POINT VIII
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO BE SELECTIVE IN ITS ACCEPTANCE OF PORTIONS OF THE JURY VERDICT AND REJECTION OF OTHER PORTIONS.
Appellants argue that the court must either accept or reject
the findings of the advisory jury in their entirety; that it was
improper for the court to "pick and choose."

Respondents answer

that it is elementary that the function of an advisory jury is
only advisory.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39(c) provide for an advisory jury.

Professor Moore has interpreted the use of an ad-

visory jury under Federal Rule 39(c), which is similar to the
Utah Rule, as merely an aid to the judge since the judge still must
make his own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and must bear
the ultimate responsibility for the judgment.
eral Practice, §39.10(1).

See 5 Mooref s Fed-

It was not reversible error for the

court to be selective in its acceptance of the jury's findings.
Furthermore, the court only rejected the answer to interro-32- .-
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gatory No. 1^ out of 16_ interrogatories submitted to the jury.
It was obvious that the jury misunderstood the question, because
it was negatively phrased for this was the only interrogatory
that was answered in the appellants favor.

When considered with

the jury's other answers it is patently clear that if it had not
been for the reverse phraseology this question too would have been
answered in favor of the respondents*
POINT IX
THE ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT AMPLY SUPPORTS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
BAGNALLS.
In response to appellants1 Point IX, in which appellants argue that the testimony of the Bagnalls was contradictory, respondents answer that any question as to credibility of the Bagnalls
could only be determined by an appellate court on the basis of
the entire record.

Even if there exists some minor, inconsequen-

tial contradiction in respondents1 testimony, still the overwhelming bulk of the evidence clearly supports the credibility of the
Bagnalls,
POINT X
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE JUDGMENT AFFIRMED BASED.
UPON THE STATUS OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL.
The appellants chose to selectively designate only those portions of the trial transcript and exhibits which were favorable
to their position on appeal.

The record of the appellants on ap-

peal covers only the following portions of the trial transcript:
(a)

Testimony of Lynn Nielson.

(b)

Rebuttal Testimony of J.R* Bagnall on the afternoon

of April 29, 1974.
(c)

AllDigitized
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beginning April 24, 1974.
(d)

All testimony of Edgar R. Anderson.

(e)

Cross examination of Don V. Tibbs.

(f)

Direct testimony of Reed R. Maxfield.

(h)

Direct examination of Lester R. Romero by defendants'

attorney, Robert L. Lord.
(i)

All cross examination of Florence Bagnall.

(j)

Direct examination of .Bruce Watkins.

Appellants omitted the following testimony:
(a)

Direct examination of J.R. Bagnall.

(b)

Re-direct examination of J.R. Bagnall.

(c)

Direct examination of Don V. Tibbs.

(d)

Cross examination of Jackson Wanlass.

(e)

All cross examination of Reed R. Maxfield.

(Note:

Respondent called Mr. Maxfield as an adverse v/itness) .
(f)

Cross, re-direct, and re-cross of Lester R. Romero.

(g)

All direct and re-direct of Florence Bagnall.

(h)

Cross, re-direct, re-cross,, further re-direct of

Bruce Watkins.
(i)

All testimony of Mildred S. Maxfield.

(j)

All testimony of Lavera Maxfield.

(k)

All testimony of Leland Peterson.

(1)

All testimony of John Brown.

.(m)

All testimony of Edgar Anderson.

(n)

All testimony of Lynn Nielson.

(0)

All testimony of Robert Lord.

Appellants designated only the following exhibits:
(1)

Plaintiffs1 exhibits 3-7, 10, 11, 14-18, 27, 29-32, 3
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36 and 40.
(2)

•

Defendants1, exhibits 12-20, 22, 25, 26, 32-35, 46 and 47.

Appellants elected to omit the following exhibits:
(1)

Plaintiffs1 exhibits 1, 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, 19-26, 28, 33,

35, 37-39 and 41-58.
(2)

Defendants' exhibits 21, 23, 24, 27-31, 36-45, 48 and 49.

(There were no defendants1 exhibits 1-11).
It should be noted that plaintiffs1 exhibit 9 was a schedule
of payments showing the delinquent amounts owed by the appellants.
Plaintiffs' exhibit 12 was a summary of the escrow account showing
what had been deposited by the appellants.
Respondent refers the Court to pages 672, 676-680 of the
record which is a record of the witnesses called and the exhibits
introduced at trial.

A cursory examination of the exhibits omitted

by appellants, as outlined above, will show that other relevant
exhibits were not designated by the appellants.
Appellants' burden on appeal is to show that the findings
and conclusions of the trial court are in error.

Latimer v.

Katz, 29 U\2d 280, 508 P.2d 542 (1973), Ewell & Son,. Inc. v.
Salt Lake City Corporation, 27 U.2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972).
This is true because the actions of the trial court are clothed
with a presumption of validity, and the appellant must show such
serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
Searle. v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974).

The appellate court

will reverse the decision of the trial court only if the evidence
clearly preponderates against the trial court's findings and
judgment.

Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 U.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811

(1972), and First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Company, 27
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U.2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971).
To sustain the burden of showing that the trial court's
decision was in error, appellants are required to bring all the
evidence relating to the issues on appeal before the court, in
order to allow the court to determine the weight and validity of
the evidence presented at the trial.

The appellate court requires

all of the record in order to knowingly decide the issues,

This

rule is lucidly stated in Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 423, 150
P.2d 100 (1944):
"On appeal the appellant has the burden
of showing wherein the trial, court erred.
If the record is not sufficient to determine a material question because of the
fact that the appellant has failed to bring
enough of it before us, the doubts should
be resolved in favor of sustaining the
judgment." Id. at 101.
This rule has been reaffirmed in James Manufacturing Company
v> Wilson, 15 U.2d 210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964), a case whose facts
are very similar to this case.

In James the appellant was con-

testing the sufficiency of the evidence which supported the trial
court's judgment.

The appellant had not designated all of the

trial record on appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled that:

. . . plaintiff saw fit to include only
a portion of the testimony in the record upon this appeal. Under the circumstances it is impossible for this court
to properly assess the entire evidence and
determine whether the trial court was correct in denying these motions of the plaintiff. It must, therefore, be presumed that
the rulings were supported by the evidence
produced at the trial." Id. at 129.
See also Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, 17 U„2d 181,
407 P.2d 565 (1965), Bennett Leasing Company v. Ellison, 15 U.2d
72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963), Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Neilson,
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26 U.2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (.1971) and Watkins v. Siraonds, 14
U.2d 406, 385 P.2d 154 (1963).
The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly stated that failure
to designate all of the pertinent record will result in a presumption that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support
the verdict.
These opinions are in line with reason and the decisions
of courts in other jurisdictions.
"If the evidence is not in the record,
the presumption is that is was sufficient to sustain the judgment, and that
it supported all findings of fact and
all facts pleaded and essential to the
judgment. If only part of the evidence
is in the record, the presumption is
that the omitted evidence supports the
judgment, and that is sufficient to
cure any defects in the evidence brought
up ff
*
4 Am. Jr. 2d, Appeal and Error,
§526.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure now require that
the entire transcript be sent by the clerk of the court to the
appellate court unless the parties stipulate to omit unnecessary
evidence.

F.R.A.P. 10(a).

Appellants in the federal courts

have the responsibility . . .
". . . to insure that the record contains
everything that is necessary for the
determination of the issues presented by
the appeal » . . ." 9 Moore's Federal
Practice, 11210.03..
These federal courts realized long ago that the entire
record pertaining to the issues was necessary in order to evaluate
the claims of the appellant.

To proceed otherwise would result

in conjecture and injustice.

This problem has been recognized in

the federal courts and by the Utah Supreme Court for many years,
and the problem has been remedied by requiring the designation of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-37-"

all the trial record relevant to the appeal.
Appellants in this case have omitted almost all of the
evidence favorable to the respondent relating to the issues on
appeal.

Appellants for the most part have included only the

direct testimony of their witnesses and the cross-examination of
adverse witnesses.

This is an obvious attempt to slant the

weight and credibility of the evidence at trial.

It is just this

sort of abuse that the Utah Supreme Court has attempted to eliminate
by the rulings cited above.
This objection is particularly relevant to Point IX of
appellants1 brief.

In this point appellants allege that a

reading of the entire transcript reveals that the plaintiffs'
testimony is contradictory.

Appellant is required to produce

the entire transcript in order for this Court to analyze this
claim.

If this record is not included/ this Court should,

affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Appellants1 designated record is insufficient to allow
this Court to knowledgeably analyze the findings and judgment
of the trial court.

Appellants have failed to meet their

burden of,proof on appeal because the Court must presume that
the trial court's findings and judgment were supported by the
omitted evidence.

Appellants1 failure to designate all of the

trial record pertaining to the issues on appeal is fatal to
their argument and the appeal should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Respondents conclude that the judgment in favor of the respondents and against the appellants forfeiting the real estate
agreement and quieting title in the respondents, except for an
-38-
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undivided 1/2 interest in 14 0.15 acres, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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